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SOMMARY OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CAPTAIN SAN D. FRANCISCO, xxxxxxxxxxx
535-38-5087FV
xxxxxxxxx

... .

1. Colonel Joseph c. Morrison, . aircraft commander, and
Captain San D. Francisco, pilot, comprised the crew of an
F-4D aircraft that departed Odom Airfield, Thailand, at
1156, 25 November 1968, to escort an RF-4C aircraft on a
photographic reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam.
There was al.most a solid overcast with cloud bases at 3,000
feet and tops at 5,000 feet. Visibility was about five
miles. At about 1245, when they were approximately 28
miles west-southwest of Donq Hoi, North Vietnam, one of the
crew members of the escort aircraft reported it had been hit.
The RF-4C climbed to altitude where the aircraft commander
notified the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
(ABCCC) that his escort aircraft had been shot down and they
alerted Search and Rescue (SAR) forces. The RF-4C crewmen
observed no ejections nor did they establish radio contact
with the F-40 crew: however, beeper siqnals were heard.
Shortly thereafter, radio contact with Colonel Morrison was
established. He reported that he was all riqht. Colonel
Morrison's location and his parachute were spotted near the
wreckaqe of his burninq aircraft within 700 yards of an
enemy encampment, about 25 .miles west-southwest of Donq Hoi.
No siqns of Captain Francisco were ·o bserved: however, two
responses were received to calls placed to him. The responses
were extremely qarbled and could not be positively identified
as havinq been· transmitted by Captain Francisco • . Heavy
qround fire and darkness prevented an attempt to rescue
· Colonel Morrison. At first liqht on 26 November 1968, voice
contact was aqain established· with Colonel Morrison and he ..
stated he was all riqht, but no contact was made with Captain
Francisco. Dense ..\cloud coveraqe. prevented any attempt to
rescue Colonel Morrison .at the..time of contact. Later, when
the weather improved, radio contact could not be re-established
with him. The search was terminated at 1130, 26 November 1968,
when further efforts to contact ,.t he officers failed and the
weather aqain deteriorated. On v.the same 'day I the North
Vietnamese claimed, in radio and newspaper reports, that an
F-4C was shot down over Quanq Binh Province on 25 November
1968, and the pilots captured. · Althouqh no names were mentioned, the date,· type of aircraft, and lQcation coincide with
the incident involvinq
Colonel Morrison ·and.·Captain Francisco.
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The Gunfighter flight 'With napes am. high-drags
There was also a Zebra flight on station
w.1.th CBli-24 and M-ll7
We recommemed that the Jol.ly 1s be brought in
from the Ii>rthwest, from over a region of rugged Karst with no roads. This
approach would also give them a ecreen of clouds. The cloud deck ended
just north of the survivor's location and they could drop right down onto
the ridge he was on. This put them the maximum possible distance a~ from
both the roads and the known gun sites. Sandy 1 and 2 called for Sandy 7
to bring Jol.Q" Green 19 and 20 into area at 1735, however,, the other tw:>
Jolly Greens were le.rt in their orbit in Laos. Because of this, lft'len
Jolly Green 20 was hit "With small anns fire, there was insufficient daYlight rems.~ for another attempt. Misty 71 also arrived in . the area
a8Mlsty
was IeaTing for a tanker. En.route back from the tanker Misty
41 monitored the progress as Sandy l led Jolly Green 20 to the survivor.
As Jolly Green 20 came to a hover, he received small arms fire from both
sides. He took 5 hits through the floor and withdrew :t'rom the area,
escorted by Jolly Green 19. As previously stated, since the other pair
of Jolly Greens were held out of country, there ,,.._s insufficient daylight
remaining tor another attempt. The time lilas appro.xilnately 1800. Sandy 1
lilas infomed by Crown 6 that the effort was to be te:nninated for the evening,
since they didn't have time to get another Jolly in. Cro'Wll 6 asked the
Mi.sty'• to remain in the area and expend the remaining fast movers on
station against the gun sites. Sandy's 1 and 2 also remained and, by making
dry, low passes, attempted to draw small a~ fire Wiich they then expended
on. Sandy 1 informed the survivor of' the situation and told him to dig in
for the night, that we 'WOuld be back at first light. Tre survivor said lw
didn't think he l«<:>uld still be there, but he would try: Misty 4l orbited
the area while M-61 am 71 expended Zebra, Flamingo, and the Gunfighters.
We remained to advise as to the location of the survivor am the location
of the suspected gun sites. The only grourrl fire directed at the fighters
was a ZPU site that opened up on Zebra flight. M-41 marked the site 'With
our last WP and it was hit. No airbursts 'W9re observed, and no ground
fire at all after the ZPU was silenced. At one point, Misty 41 ha.d to
prevent Flamingo from draping CBU-24 directly on the survivor's position.
Misty 41 and 71 RTB'ed at 1900 together.
to scattered at this time.

waa still holding in the area.

•s.

2. The SAR for the following morning was scheduled for .first light. At
least tw flights of fighters, both Samples - wre scheduled to be on
station. A frequency 'W&s set up to hold and control tfle fighters on enroute
and on the tanker. Misty 11 and 21 -were scheduled tbr 0600 and 0615 take
off's and the SAR forces (Jolly and Sandy) were scheduled to be on station
at first light. On the mo~ ot the 26th, Misiqr 21 briefed (Holden/
Konopka) at 0400. Prior ~ going to the aircraft, Blue Chip called and said
there was fog in the area and they wanted to hold 21 on the g:roun:l, us~
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Mist;y ll as a weather recce. We requested that the arigiial
e o
schedule be adhered to in order to start the cycle to have one Misty
al~ in the area.
eed to this and we launched on time. Miscy 11
in the area and obtained voice contact with 2A at
5. e
wather was
c ear except !or thin pat ea o gro
og
n
e ravines and low
spots. We !alt this "WOuld burn off as soon as the sun hit it. We passed
this naluation to Crown 4. The position of the survivor was under one o!
the patches of low tog.
attan ted contact at 0725 and was immediate
answere41
02A. He stated that he was n .K. so ta • At t s
me
og
egun
recede as the sun
•
n ac , w tho-ught the
survivor lllight be out from uDier the tldge of it. We asked him. if he was
in the clear or not. He said he wa.s so far doW'l into the grass he couldn •t
see if be was in the clear or not. We told hiiii to go . do'Wll on his radio &iii
stay covered, that tne Sirid)'s ana CJol..ly!s were on the way. We assumed that
they wre, since it was to have been a first light effort and we rad passed
to Crown that the tog "Wa.S bum~ off. We infonned Cro"Wn 4 that we had contact with the survivor am that he was all right. We stated that there 'AS
still a little fog in his immediate location, but that the sun was beginning
to reach it and it wuld be burnt off in .30 to 4D minutes. Crown 4 acknowledged and wanted to know if we wanted Bass fiight cleared in, "We told Cro'W?l
we were going for a tanker and to pase Bass to M-11. We departed for a
tanker at approxi.Jmtely (1'{40. At this time M-11 was 20 miles out, inbowxi
from the tanker. We gave a situation report to them ·and told them that the
survivor was to coim up on radio again at 0800. M-11 asked if the Jol.l,y 1s
and Sandy's were on the way. We said yes. Crown 4 broke in and said that
the.r waren •t, that they were being held on the grourxi at NKP. Both M-11
and K2l told Crown 4 to launch them ilmnedia tely a.rd asked why they were not
on the way. Misty ll expended Bass on the gun positions while M-21 was
enroute back .from the tanker. Misty 21 re-entered the SAR area at
approximately 0000 as Bass was finishing up. Appro.x:iJmtely 40 to 50 rounds
of 2J/J7mm .fire were directed at Bass, however this was the only growxi fire
directed at anyone on the 26th. Later in the morning 1 Miscy 2l experxied
Barracuda and encounted no groum fi:na of any kind. At this tima, approximately 0810, Miscy 11 asked Crown 4 how far out the Sandys and Jollys were.
Crown 4 stated that they were still being held on the growxi and they
wanted another weather report. He said to pass "exactly what you 1ve got
and if we can we will tr.y and get thElll {Jolly's and Sandy's) airborne".
Crown 4 also wanted to know i t poesibly -we might want 'be> expeni some more
fast mOV'ers prior to getting tm Jol.l,y 1 s azxl landy 1 s up. We again inf'ormed
Croll'\ 4 that the ground fog was burning off am tha.t it "WOuld be gone lo~
befor'e the Jolly's and Sandy's could get to the area. We again requested
an inmecli.ate launch for tile Jolly 1s and Sandy's, especia.llY since we were
Wonned tha. t it would take lHr minimum for them to &ITive. Crown 4 also
wanted the status of the groum .fire. We ini'arnted him that the only kno'Wll
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.fire was caning from areas north and south of the survivor at ranges which

1

wuld not interfere with the actual pick-up. Further, that in the immediate
area of the survi:var they could expect small arms only and that we -would
have to re:cy on the Sandys to locate and surpress it anyway. Crown 4
acknowledged and said he 'WOuld pass the report to "fl.teen". Miscy 11 -went
to the tanker at this time, approxilllately 0815. At 0820 Misty 21 made a
pass over the survivors position and raised him on voice. At this tim he
was still "O.K.". The ground fog "Was almost completely dissipated by now
and the sur'ViTOr 1 s position was in the clear. We expended Baracuda .flight
at approximately 0$45. Misty 21 remained in the area until 0915 and returned from the tanker a.t 094{). Upon our return Misty 11 was expending
Gunfighter !'ligh,t. The Sandy's finally arrived at 0945 and began calling
Grommet 02A on guard. Misty 11 made pass over the sur'Vivor and lit his
burner. There was no response. The survivor, 02A, never came up on voice
or beeper again, nor did he make any other signal of ~y kind. The last
contact was at 082 lcl
Mis
21 at which time he was "O.K. ''. Misty 21
remained in the area while Sanely 1 and
tlew ow over
pos tion and
called on guard. At 1100, 'With the wather in the area beginniI:{S to
deteriorate as cumulus formed, and with no response from 02A. Misty 21
RTBed to Phu Cat. Mission unaccomplisood. Flying time for M-U on the 25th
9+00; for M-21 on the 26th - 5+00. It is significant to note that; had
the Jol:cy Greens and the Sandy's been launched at 0725 when Misty first
discovered that they were not airborne and requested they be launched;
they w:>uld have bMl'l on the scene when the weather lM>.t clear at 0820 and
when Misty 21 still had voice contact with Grommet 02A.

3,.

This report has been written 'With the aid or voice tapes nade during
the SAR effort by Capt Holden. These etate.ue nts \rbich are indicated as
quates are taken verbatim from these tapes.

~~~O~t,

USAF

Commando Sabre Pilot

UNC~S1~IED

~C~K~~pt,
Sa~:~ot

USAF

Commando

J
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1. At 1700 Misty 71 ltB.B launched u an exj;ra sortie to help with the
Gromnet SAR effort. We arri.Ted in the area at 1740 at just about the
time the SAR effort 'W&IS called off because the Jolly ha.d been hit. We
directed, or holpen Misty 41 direct, Zebra, F1amingo and gun fighter
flight upon gun poeitions south of the survivor. We RTB'ed with Misty
41 at 1900.
2. On the morning of the 26th we flew KU!ty ll, arrived in the area
and established contact with Gro11111et 02A at 0655. He stated he was
all right. It was still a.lm.ost clouds in the valleys and we could see
fog in the valleys, otherwise the visibility in the illlmediate area was
clear. Misty 21 arrived and we proceeded to refuel. · Enroute back to
the area M-21 briefed us and -we put Bass flights in on suspected gun
sites south of the survivor. At this time, oaoo, I asked Crown if the
Sandy's and Jollys were enroute and 'es told they were being held on
the ground at NKP. We requested an immediate launch. I had previously
thought the Sandye and Jollys \>Ould launch to arrive on scene at daylight because it was to be a first light effort. About 10 minutes
later I asked Crown the position of the Sandye and was told they were
being held and that they -wanted another weather report. Since all Dzy"
previous 1118athar reports were favorable I said to pass the -weather
that you have and to launch the Sandys and Jol.lys. Only our flights
of fighters received ground fire and that was Bass who received 40/50
rounds of 23/37w.n. At 0$20 1 M-21 made a low pass over the survivor
and he caine up voice and said he was OK. Since it was going to be an
hour for Sandy and Jolly to arrive we expended, or helped, Barracuda
and Gunfighter flights. The Sandys arrived at 0945 and started calling
Grommet 02A and no contact was ever made. I made a low A/B pass at
0955 with no response. We remained in the area until 1130 and RTB 1 ed
due to weather and no contact Hi.th Grommet 02A.

C~l::~AF

Coimnando Sabre Operations Officer
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~~~~lSAF
Camnando Sabre Pilot
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Ch November 25, I particapa.ted in ~e SAR e.tfort for Gran.et 02.
Misty 51 'NB8 in voice contact with 02A when I arrived. He briefed
me on the location of the downed pilot and known 37mm positions in

1.

the imn.ediate area, I then
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the area to refuel.

le~

2. When I returned, Crown had several flights of fighters available
tor flak suppression. The first flight to expend received very heavy
AAA fire. I estimated 100 air bursts on each pass. T'-0 additional
flights were used and the guns appeared to be eompletel.7 silenced.
Shortly therea.ft.er; Sandy arrived on the scene. He made numerous low
passes attenpting to draw ground fire. When he didn't receive any,
the Jolly attempted a pick-up~ As he approached a hover he received
automatic weapons f:lre from several locations, forceing him to withdraw
with battle damage.

3.

Tm second pair of Jollye were too far away to reach the scene
prior to darkness. The SAR effort was tenninated for the night. The
remaining fighters were expemed on suspected gun positions.

4. Comments.

The back up Jollys ehould have been holding much closer
A second rescue attsnpt could lave
been made prior to the onset of darkness • As I recall the J ollys -were

to the locations ••d the survivor.

being held

35nm wwst of the scene.
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O~apt,

ROOERT J. FI
Commando Sabre Pilot
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USAF
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Room P. RICE~ 1 Lt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot
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t:?..r:;~t a.ree., RT'~ 137.
At 12441• the fli,'Sht
started its run at the s •mthnrn no:i.nt of R'l'E 137 at 1000 1 .A.GL, heading 013)
at a.ppro:r..ima.tely 1245L Gromment 02 broad.casted, "We've tali::en a hit. 11 Innnediatel~r Grommcnt 01 broke off the nm, cl.imbin::, to n.l ti °t'Jde 8.!l.cl est::'.blishecl
th2.t Gromment 02 had b0en shot (1.mm. nror:un,:mt 01 stayed. in the ar~a until
13221. Yoice conta.ct hc.0. been mt>.de with Gromnen.t 02-.'l and nrol1ably with
Grol'lI!lent 02-13, b~r Eisty 41.

Grmnment :'.'light prec0ec'.ec1 to the

. .~~·· ·
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~~. ~OHSTA't'."'PTE,

C:i..T\t, USAF

1l'R72510
Mavigator, ·1 romment 01
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I, John W. Wall, Hajor, FV2225979 •ms ld..rc1·a:L't Gwllllander in an H.F-4C,
call sirrn, Grommet I, which lee:.d the fli:;l1t L1 which Lajor l.for:..'ison
and Lt :i!'ra.ncisco were crewneinbers in an :?-4D flyinc win:;wa.n call sign
Grommet 2. Grommet 2 re_portec~ :;.t a)proxir.latel;;r 12<i5L in vicinity
of 1720 <le.:;1·ees H 10612 <le:;.rees E, heading 013 d.ec,-:rees, altitu,le l,OJO
feet AGL, Grounr:J. Speed a _ip:-c>oxima-~ely 540 K'.-'S, that "We 've taken a. 11it11 •
I bro:::e off :J~r :recconno.iscFJJ.Ce run and cl i:n0ed. to al ti tu.de. Gro::11net
2 never climbed to o.l tHude and joined up wit:i.1 lead . ,A SAR eff o:tt was
:ini tio.ted b,y ;:-ie , th:::.·oueh :Iarbor IIaster. Ho parachutes were observed
but a rescue beepm· w~~s heru:d. llo voice con-'.:act was :nu~1e by J:C" aircraft
with the downecl c::.·e~n:ienhers. IIis t:r 41 a.rrivec1 on scene and became t:ie
on Scene :::0J:l!l1a:1der ~·or ti1e 3.1m effort. I returned to base as requested
by C:rmm 6 ·•...-~ten r~.dio cont1·ol \-,'2.S ma:le wit'.1 llim,

~~~~~
JOlG W. ;}JUJ,
Hajm:
US.Al•'
?"'V2225979

.Aircraf t 0o:mnander Gror:nnet 01
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DEPARTMENT OF THe: Al~ FORCE

.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, O.G.

(AFPMSC)

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

uSAFMf'."C

SIJ_a.JECT:

Continuance of Mis$ing in Action Status Beyond Twelve Months - Cast : #345

RANDOL.PM AFB

T'EXA!I 78148

. I

TO:

AFPMC
l. Perso,n nel Involved: Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 10, Title
37, use, a full review has been made of the facts and circumstance! set
forth herein to determine whether the missing in action status of !':le
following named personnel may reasonably be con tinued after a year 1 3
absence or terminated by a presumptive finding of death:

Major
Captain

Joseph C. Morrison
San D. Francisco

405-30-2438 FR
535-38-5087 FV

Aircraft Conunarier
Pilot

2. Circumstances: The personnel listed above comprised the crew c f an
F-4D aircraft which departed Udorn Airfield, Thailand, at 1156 hour>,
25 November 1968, acting as escort for an RF-4C on a photographic
reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam. At approximately 1245 h)urs,
a message stating, ''We've been hit" was received from Major Morrisc 1 and
Captain Francisco's aircraft. At this time their aircraft - was abo u~ 28
miles west-southwest of Dong Hoi, North Vietnam. The crew members )f
the reconnaissance aircraft, unable to make visual contact since th 1y
were positioned in front of the damaged aircraft, broke off their rm,
climbed to a higher altitude, and alerted search and rescue forces.
Beeper signals were heard; however, no parachutes were observed, nc~
was voice contact established.
3. Search Efforts: En route to the area, a forward air controller
(FAC) heard Major Morrison reply to a radio request for his call si 1n,
and as he neared the area, received a radio transmission from Major
Morrison stating he was all right. The reconnaissance aircraft ret 1rned
to base, and the FAC became the commander of the search and rescue \ffort.
Major Morrison and his parachute were observed near the burning wre :kage
within 700 yards of an enemy encampment. Several people and a numb \r of
trucks were seen in the inunediate vicinity. When Major Morrison wa ;
asked if he had made contact with Captain Francisco, he stated that he
had not heard from him, but he should have gotten out. Attempts we ·:e
made to establish voice contact with Captain Francisco and two tran i missions were received in reply, but since they were extremely garb 1.ed,
and their location could not be pinpointed, it was impossible to de '. ermine their origin~ Other aircraft arrived in the area to assist in
suppression of enemy fire and rescue operaticns. Heavy ground fire continued throughout the search. Due to darkness and the hostility in the
area, the search was suspended. At first light the following day, t:he
search was resumed and voice contact was established with Major Mor::ison
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at which time he stated he was all right; however, a rescue could n )t
be effected due to the dense cloud coverage. When the weather had
cleared sufficiently to attempt a recovery, voice contact could not be
established. Since search efforts were again hampered by deteriora :ing
weather and no further contact was made, the search was ~erminated ,1t
1130 hours, on 26 November 1968 •

'

4. Supplemental Information: A Hanoi radio broadcast on 26 Novemb !r
1968, stated an A-3J and an F-4C aircraft were shot down over North
Vietnam on 25 November 1968. The report claimed the F-4C aircraft 11as
downed over Quang Binh Province and its pilots captured. A similar
report appeared in an article in a North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan,
on 26 November 1968. Although no names were mentioned, the date,
similar type of aircraft, and location coincide with the incident
involving Major Morrison and Captain Francisco. In addition to the~r
aircraft, one Navy aircraft was lost over North Vietnam on that dat•! .
To date, no further information has been received which would clari::y
their status.
5. Discuss ion: An examination of the available information compeli:
the conclusion that a reasonable possibility exists for the continw d
survival of Major Morrison and Captain Francisco. This conclusion ~ . s
supported by the recorded evidence which establishes that, although the
aircraft was not under observation at the time and no parachutes we; e
observed, beeper signals were heard and radio contact was made with
Major Morrison after reaching the ground. It is therefore possible that
Captain Francisco was also able to reach the ground, and for unknowi t
reasons was unable to make his presence known. The incident occurred
over a heavily populated area and it is logical to assume that they
could not have evaded capture for any length of time. The absence e f
a report establishing their status as prisoners is no indication th; t
such is not the case since the North Vietnamese and their agencies
reject any obligation under the Geneva Convention to report the name s
of our personnel in their custody. Until new evidence is produced er
other events occur which overcome this possibility, it is reasonable to
assume that they may still be alive and any change in their statt:s r n
this date may be premature and beyond the safe calculated risk of e r ror.
6. RECOMMENDATION: Pursuant to the authority contained in Section 555,
Title 37, USC, and following the mandatory review of all availab:e i nformation on this date, it is reconunended that official casualty reporf s
be issued stating that Major Joseph C. Morrison, 405-30-2438 FR, anil
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Captain San D. Francisco, 535-38-5087 FV, will be continued in a mirsing in action status following the expiration of twelve months' absc nee,
effective 26 November 1969.
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List of Source Material

. _J HENRY 8. BRIDGET, Colonel, USAF

~.

Director of Personnel

~ervi~~

1 3 NOV 1969
Under the authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to t~e
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, c·r
the officer acting in his stead, the above reconnnendation is approv€ i.

ROBERT 'J. MALOY
Brigadier Gc~era l, USAF
Deputy Asst u:::S/?ersonnel for Mil Pers
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